held in Denmark and Sweden regarding participation in the EMU. We find that voters in regions with a high proportion of interest-sensitive sectors and low international integration tend to oppose participation in a currency union. The opposite is true for non-interest-sensitive sectors with relatively high integration. These findings are in line with the hypothesis of rational voters maximizing utility. Furthermore, perceived net costs are found to increase with distance from the European core and with the age of voters, indicating that a national currency represents an experience good. These results are robust to spatial dependencies and are not driven by broader forms of Euro-skepticism.
Introduction
A common monetary policy within competitive markets may hardly target regional particularities and requirements (CRONE, 2007) . However, there is a regionally heterogeneous transmission of a common monetary policy, and this heterogeneity is most likely attributable to regional differences in the industry mix (CARLINO & DEFINA, 1998 , 1999 . VAR models have shown that distinct sectors react differently to monetary shocks. Accordingly, interest-sensitive sectors that rely heavily on foreign capital are adversely affected by a monetary policy that is oriented to the average needs of a common market. Understanding the regional dimension of monetary policies is crucial, particularly within heterogeneous currency areas such as the European Monetary Union (EMU), as it helps to build ex- show increased local opposition to the EMU in the referenda.
We go beyond the scope of the existing literature on the regional and sectoral effects of monetary policy by considering relative benefits that vary across sectors and regions depending on the integration within the currency union. As a result of both influences, regions with a strong presence of industries with low integration and high interest sensitivity should exhibit a relatively large proportion of votes against the EMU, while the opposite should be true in regions where industries with high integration and relatively low interest sensitivity are concentrated.
We provide evidence on a range of further determinants of regional opposition to the EMU, identifying influencing factors such as remoteness to European and national economic cores, urbanity, average age, rate of unemployment and support of political parties that oppose the Euro. While the impact of the key sectors of interest was found to be robust and consistent across countries, the other influencing factors partly varied between countries.
These findings are of particular relevance, as the current global financial crisis has reintroduced the question of EMU membership. In Denmark, a second referendum will be held prior to the next elections in 2011. In Sweden, the topic is a central issue of the 2010 election. HCED 
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2 Regional Effects of Monetary Policy
Optimum Currency Area Theory and Regional Effects of Monetary Policy
Following the Maastricht treaty, the EMU became effective on the January 1, 1999. Whether a single currency for a broad set of European countries could be appropriate has been heavily discussed at least since the treaty was signed in 1992. However, the scholarly debate about the efficiency of currency unions in general has a much deeper tradition. Clearly, currency unions may reduce transaction costs of trade with partner economies and reduce the risk associated with transnational investment, although critics sometimes argue that these benefits are negligible (CALMFORS et al., 1997; FELDSTEIN, 1997) . However, these benefits come at the expense of giving up an independent national monetary and exchange rate policy. The related cost can be negligible if the criteria of optimum currency areas (OCA) apply (MUNDELL, 1961) .
The 'homogeneity of countries' has emerged as the 'catch all' OCA property (MONGELLI, 2002) ; if countries all face the same common shocks, a common monetary policy will be appropriate (FELDSTEIN, 1997) . The empirical literature, however, has quite clearly rejected homogeneity for European countries, e.g., by
analyzing business cycles. Although some studies find significant correlations between business cycles for a core of European countries, regional supply and demand shocks and response functions are substantially less correlated than those between U.S. states (BAYOUMI & EICHENGREEN, 1993 . Also, labor mobility within European countries is relatively small compared to that within the US (OBSTFELD & PERI, 1998) . Finally, Sachs and Sala-I-Martin (1992) , 1997) . Indeed, there is evidence that increased trade within a currency union leads to a reduction in economic heterogeneity (DE GRAUWE, 2007) . Nevertheless, it seems fairly justified to state that by the time of the referenda in Denmark (2000) and Sweden (2003) , the EMU did not represent an OCA for both countries and that there would have been substantial costs associated with joining the EMU, which is one of the key essences we need as a background for our analyses.
The second issue, which is essential in the context of our analysis, is that monetary policies trigger not only distinct reactions across member states of currency unions but also different reactions within regions of single countries. Recent research suggests that heterogeneity between regions of a single country may be as influential as differences across countries. It is, therefore, easier to identify a set of European core regions than core countries (FORNI & REICHLIN, 1997 ).
This is because almost all traditional core countries show some regions that do not comply with core group characteristics, while non-core countries contain important regions that behave synchronously with the European core. This phenomenon is gaining in strength as correlations between regions within single countries have been decreasing over time, while cross-country correlations between regions of different countries have increased (FATAS, 1997) . However, most of the research on the perception of monetary policies still focuses on a national scale (DOW & RODRÍGUEZ-FUENTES, 2003) . As an exception, CARLINO & DEFINA (1999) identify on the basis of structural VAR models considerable differences across U.S.
regions in the economic perception of common monetary shocks. Sectoral differences in interest rate sensitivity provide a straightforward explanation for these distinct reactions (CRONE, 2007 countries that are subject to national idiosyncratic shocks might be left with a less appropriate monetary policy compared to a national regime. Within countries, regions whose economies exhibit strong interest sensitivity will be disproportionally affected, e.g., by an inappropriately high interest rate (DORNBUSCH, FAVERO, & GIAVAZZI, 1998) .
However, the existence of costs associated with joining a currency area by no means implies that joining would not be feasible, as costs still need to be weighed against the benefits. A more open economy will reap higher gains from the reduction in transaction costs and exchange rate speculation and uncertainty.
In contrast, the benefits of an independent monetary policy and exchange rate policy decline with the openness of an economy (KRUGMAN, 1990; MCKINNON, 1963 countries makes it more likely that wages and prices are explicitly or implicitly indexed (KRUGMAN, 1990) . As a result, the feasibility of joining a currency union essentially depends on the degree of economic integration (I) as well as economic homogeneity (H) (e.g., in terms of business cycles) with respect to the partner countries. Given a certain level of integration I*, a high degree of homogeneity would make a currency union desirable, while in the case of high heterogeneity the outside option would be feasible.
This basic scheme also proves a useful framework for the analysis of the sectoral and regional dimension of the cost-benefit problem. While the cost of joining the currency area for sector n still depends on the overall level of the country's integration I and heterogeneity H (which are crucial for determining whether the overall economic development in the country is going to be affected positively or negatively) it will also depend on the degree to which a sector depends on foreign capital and thus its interest rate sensitivity (i n ). At the same time, benefits from joining the currency union are also likely to vary across sectors. Again, a sector's benefit from joining the currency union will depend on the overall level of integration I, as its perspective depends on the overall evolution of the national economy. A sector's benefit will also depend on its own integration I n with the currency area, which may differ across sectors. A sector's net benefit N n thus depends on the overall level of integration I and heterogeneity H of the national economy, its own integration with the other economy I n and its interest sensitivity i n , given that we deal with a non-OCA:
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A relatively high interest rate sensitivity of a sector under these assumptions leads to higher net costs when compared to an average sector. Net costs further increase if the sector has a particularly low integration with the other currency union member states' economies. In the opposite case of a sector that is not particularly interest rate sensitive (or additionally exhibits a high integration), there will be a net benefit of the sector relative to the rest of the economy. The utility of a rational voter in a referendum on joining a currency union thus depends on the economic structure of the region where she works. The probability that a perfectly informed voter will vote against the currency union (V) is positively related to the net cost that the local industries will experience from the country's participation in the currency union. The probability will accordingly depend on the national level of economic integration and heterogeneity with respect to the rest of the currency area, the respective integration of the local industry I l and the industry's interest sensitivity i l as well as idiosyncratic prefe-
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As the integration and interest rate sensitivity of the local industry depend on the relative importance of local sectors (s n ), so does the rational vote:
The impact of the relative importance of a sector n on the decision of a rational voter in turn depends on the combination of relative currency area integration and interest rate sensitivity relative to other sectors. Clearly, the presence of sectors that exhibit relatively high interest rate sensitivity and low integration should raise the probability of a "no-vote," while the opposite is true for sectors with low interest rate sensitivity and high integration. Table 1 provides an inexhaustive classification of sectors that exhibit either relatively high interest sensitivity or integration, accompanied by the expected marginal impact on the probability of a "no-vote".
As shown by CARLINO & DEFINA (1998 , 1999 among others, construction and manufacturing of consumer durables and capital goods tend to be among the most interest-sensitive industries. While services generally tend to be relatively independent of large amounts of foreign capital, a strong interest rate sensitivity has been revealed for wholesale and retail as well as transport and communication (GEORGOPOULOS, 2009 
Below average
Other services -Notes: Own illustration on the basis of CARLINO & DEFINA (1998 , 1999 and GEORGOPOULOS (2009).
The Euro-referenda in Denmark and Sweden
On September 28, 2000 and September 14, 2003, Danish and Swedish voters were asked whether their countries should join the EMU in binding public referenda. There had not been any institutional requirements for the referenda, and in both countries, the government parties as well as the majority of opposing parties were supporting participation in the currency union. However, there was a surprisingly clear rate of rejection in both cases, which was interpreted as representing an increasing gap between the elite and the masses (MARCUSSEN & ZØLNER, 2003; WIDFELDT, 2004) .
In Sweden, 55.9 percent of the voters opted for the no-alternative, and the turnout was 82.6 percent. Voters followed the recommendation of the CALMFORS et al. (1997) Commission, which stated that Sweden should stay out of the EMU, maintain a floating exchange rate regime and reconsider the issue of joining in the near future. As Sweden was a late member of the EU, joining in 1994, its ties with the core might strengthen over time, making EMU membership more desirable later (BERGMAN, CHEUNG, & HUTCHISON, 1997) .
In the Danish case, the negative effects of a currency union were expected to be weaker, as the country is closer to the European core ( 3 Empirical Analysis
Empirical Strategy
Ideally, an empirical test of equation (3) would be based on observations of the individual decisions and characteristics of voters, including their place of work.
Such data, however, are not available, so the outcome of public referenda needs to be analyzed on the basis of data referring to more or less aggregated spatial units. It has become common praxis in the applied public choice literature to employ aggregated data (see e.g. DEACON & SHAPIRO, 1975; KAHN & MATSUSAKA, 1997; KLINE & WICHELNS, 1994; SCHULZE & URSPRUNG, 2000) . Building on equation (3), we can assume that the probability V j of a voter j voting "no" is related to countrywide effects of integration (I) and heterogeneity H with respect to the currency area that is captured by α, the relevance of one or numerous sectors n at the voter's place of work (s n ) as well as a range of attributes x m that influence idiosyncratic preferences and other particularities of the voter's locality. The probability of a "no-vote" could be described with the cumulative logistic probability function:
where , and are parameters. With this model, it follows that individuals will vote "no," provided that ∑ ∑ exceeds a certain threshold. If the behavior at the polls follows such a model, there is a linear relationship between the logarithm of the odds of a "yes" vote and the vector of the exogenous variables. Following the methodology of ecological inference, grouped statistical data can be used assuming that within constituencies individuals are completely identical with respect to the model attributes. 1 Within the constraints of these assumptions, the probability V j that a representative voter will vote "no"
can then be approximated through the percentage share of "no" votes pcv i of 1 An extensive discussion of the underlying assumptions of ecological inference can be found in SHIVELY (1969) , KING (1997 ), or KING, ROSEN, & TANNER (2004 .
constituency i. Equation (4) can thus be transferred into a regression equation of the following form:
.
To correct for heteroskedasticity, variables are weighted with w i , the inverse of the square root of the variance of the error term ε i (MADDALA, 1983 ; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, 1998):
where o i is the total number of votes and r i is the number of no-votes in constitu-
The assumption of the homogeneity of individuals with respect to observable characteristics is obviously a rigid one. If, e.g., participation of voters in the referendum varies systematically with certain attributes, then the results will be biased (ecological fallacy). It is therefore more appropriate to interpret the results at the aggregated level to which the data refer. For the ease of quantitative interpretation, a number of studies have abstracted from equation (4) 
While we show results corresponding to equation (5) mainly for the purpose of robustness checks, the bulk of our empirical analyses rely on the OLS approach (7).
LM tests reveal a limited degree of spatial dependency in the data, which is possibly due to spatial measurement errors and omitted variables correlated across space. As the test score rejects a spatial lag model in favor of an error correction model, we employ maximum likelihood estimators to correct for spatial struc- 
where W is a contiguity weights matrix. 3 The relative importance of a sector n in region i is captured by the respective proportion of the sector at total employment. All regions are treated as neighbors that are separated by a less-than-5-km edge distance to account for numerous minor fjords in the study area. If a region has no neighbor within a 5 km edge distance, than the nearest neighbor is assigned. Alternative weights matrices on the basis of various distance thresholds generally yield the same result. Rostock (results were generally less comprehensive and will therefore not be reported). As the primary alternative for within-country centrality, however, a market potential (MP) in the HARRIS (1954) tradition is employed that is the distance (dist ij )-weighted aggregate of GDP j of regions j neighboring region i. We use a standard internal distance measure dist ii to account for heterogeneity in the size of regions (REDDING & VENABLES, 2004) .
Parameter a, which determines the degree to which neighboring regions are discounted on distance, is set to a value of 0.012 after evaluation of numerous alternatives based on the standard information criteria. This value is within the range of parameter estimates provided by , which were derived from the estimation of a European spatial wage-income relationship.
In small spatial units such as municipalities, cross commuting may lead to the sectoral composition at neighboring municipalities exhibiting an impact on the local voting outcome. As an alternative to the within-region fraction of total employment, we therefore propose the proportion of distance-weighted employment within a sector at distance-weighted total employment. The same internal distance measure applies as in (9). The spatial discount parameter b is set to 0.1, which is roughly in line with the work of AHLFELDT (2008), who estimates a commuting cost function to account for the employment opportunities in neighboring municipalities. This parameter value implies that only a small fraction of people commutes at distances larger than 50 km; this seems to reflect well the situation in Sweden (ÖHMAN & LINDGREN, 2003) . The implicit decay functions according to parameters a and b are visualized in Figure A1 in the appendix.
While in the first instance we focus on the case of Sweden, where the alternative option to joining the currency union was flexible exchange rates, results are also compared to the case of Denmark. We further consider the 1994 referendum on the EU participation of Sweden, which implicitly was a referendum on the Euro perspective, given that the EU had agreed on the plans for a currency union in 1992. The empirical analyses rely on data at the level of municipalities, which is the highest detail for which the considered data are available.
Data
All data used in the empirical analyses were obtained from the national agencies for statistics, i.e., the Statbank Denmark and the Statistika centralbyrån of Sweden. Sweden is subdivided into 21 'Län' or counties, with these counties being subdivided into 290 municipalities. Denmark is subdivided into 15 counties 6 and 275 municipalities. Regarding the key variables of interest, for Sweden a broad range of sectorally disaggregated data on employment and output were available at the municipality level, including construction, the manufacturing of consumer durables and capital goods and various services, among others. Some of the NACE classifications that are of particular interest following table 1 are D25-33, the manufacturing of consumer durables and capital goods ; F45, construction ; G-O, services (in particular, G50-52, wholesale and retailing; and I60-62 transport, storage and communications). For Denmark, however, access was generally more restricted. At the municipal level, data were grouped into 9 sectors including the construction sector (F45) and financial intermediation (J6). Wholesale and retailing, however, was only available, along with hospitality (G50-52 and H55). Data on transport, storage and communications were available at the 1-digit NACE level (I6). No data were available for manufacturing of consumer durables and capital goods, as authorities claimed the respective data on industrial composition to be confidential. Another restriction of data refers to the GDP, which was only available at the county level. For the generation of market potential, we therefore approximate a municipality-level GDP on the basis of total employment at municipalities, assuming constant productivity within counties. While conducting the analysis, a few outliers that showed large residuals had to be excluded. These were in both cases municipalities with low shares of 'novotes,' suggesting that the models cannot explain these low shares sufficiently.
There is a high degree in spatial heterogeneity in the voting outcome, both in Denmark, where the share of "no-votes" varies between 29 and 75 percent, and in Sweden, where the respective share varies between 24 and 87 percent. 7 The spatial distribution of "no-votes" is visualized at the municipality level in Figure 2 .
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The respective ranges for counties are: 49 to 59 percent in Denmark and 44 to 78 percent in Sweden. Particularly in Sweden, an evident spatial pattern becomes apparent at first glance. There is striking north-south heterogeneity and a notable reduction in the share of "no-votes" along the eastern border areas, in line with the propositions made on the role of borders and centrality. Similar patterns are, if visible at all, only visible to a much lesser degree in the case of Denmark.
Empirical Results
Baseline Results for Sweden
The empirical results corresponding to our baseline specification (7) In both OLS regressions of model (1) and (2), the LM tests point to the presence of significant spatial dependency and the appropriateness of a spatial error correction model that corrects for a spatial structure in the error term as in equation (8). 8 This form of spatial dependency is likely to be caused by spatial measurement error or unobserved variables that are correlated across space.
Correction for spatial dependency, however, does not change the qualitative implications for the two key sectors of interest. In all models, as expected, larger
proportions of employment in construction increases opposition, while the opposite is true for the interest-insensitive services. The sectors for which no ex-ante expectations of voting behavior exist exhibit a less striking influence on the voting outcome. Manufacturing of consumer durables and capital goods on local opposition cannot be rejected to have no impact on the basis of any of Table 2 models. This is in line with (expected) relative positive and negative effects of the EMU cancelling each other out. Regarding the service sectors, we find significantly negative impact on no-votes for wholesale and retailing (Services G50-52) and transport, storage and communications (I60-62) in models (1) and (4) and models (1) and (3), respectively. Generally, the pattern of results remains almost unchanged throughout models (1) to (4) Note that the pattern of results is approved if the impact of manufacturing of consumer durables and capital goods and interest-insensitive services is investigated at sub-sector level. Table A1 shows results corresponding to Table ( Notes: The endogenous variable is the share of "no-votes" in all models. The sector variables represent the share of sector employment at total employment within municipalities in (1) and (3) and the same for spatially weighted employment as in equation (10) in (2) and (4). The standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity in (1) and (2) and are corrected for spatial dependency in (3) and (4). * / ** / *** denote significance at the 10 / 5 / 1 % level.
Robustness Checks for Sweden
A number of alterations to models (1) and (2) of Table 2 are tested in Table 3 to evaluate the sensitivity of results. First, we re-estimate the specifications employing a binary choice model as described in equation (5) [columns (1) and (2)]. Qualitatively, results are very similar to Table 2 , columns (1) and (2). The presence of interest-insensitive service sectors exerts a clearly negative impact on the share of "no-votes" revealing (expected) relative net benefits. Wholesale and retailing (Services G) and transport, storage and communications (Services I), again exhibit a negative impact, if any impact at all, but they are statistically insignificant in (2), when potential commuting is accounted for. The only considerable difference is that the construction sector relatively sharply fails to satisfy conventional significance criteria in model (2) (p-value 0.179). The qualitative pattern of results for non-sector control variables is exactly the same as in Table 2 , (1) and (2).
In column (3), we consider the minimum distance to the three major gateway cities Stockholm (ferry terminal, airport), Gothenburg (ferry terminal) and Malmoe (Oeresund-bridge) (distgateway) as an alternative to the market potential measure. First, we find that there is a significant positive relationship between the distance to the centers and the share of "no-votes," which, again, points to larger opposition to the EMU within peripheral areas. Second, after considering various thresholds, the best model fit is achieved when restricting the distance impact to an area no larger than 440 km of road distance from these main centers. This is done by introducing a dummy variable denoting the respective area (440km from Maincenter) in addition to an interactive term of the dummy with a continuous minimum distance measure (Distance to Maincenter). According to the estimation results, the rate of no-votes was reduced by up to 11.3 percentage points in the vicinity of the centers. With every 100 km increase in distance, the rejection rate increases by about 2.7 percent so that after 440 km, the net effect becomes close to zero. Note that the distance variable also seems to largely pick up the effect of centrality with respect to the European core, as all three Swedish main centers are in the south and the impact of distance to the ECB is rendered Notes: The sector variables represent the share of sector employment at total employment within municipalities in (1) and (3-5) and the same for spatially weighted employment as in equation (10) Comparing column (1) results to Table 2, Model (5) corresponds to model (5) in Table 3 Notes: The sector variables represent the share of sector employment at total employment within municipalities in (1) and (4-5) and the same for spatially weighted employment as in equation (10) in (2). The standard errors (in parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity. * / ** / *** denote significance at the 10 / 5 / 1 % level.
Conclusion
This article approaches the anticipated costs and benefits of a common monetary policy on the basis of public referenda on participation in the EMU held in Denmark and Sweden. These results provide new evidence on the regional effects of a common monetary policy and support the notion that the industrial mix is a significant driving force behind the regionally heterogeneous transmission (CRONE, 2007) . In contrast to previous studies that explore the regional dimension of a common monetary policy on the basis of VAR models (CARLINO & DEFINA, 1998 , 1999 , our approach allows for evaluation of regional and sectoral net cost that also takes into account potential benefits of larger currency areas. Our analysis, furthermore, is conducted at the municipal level, which presents greater spatial detail than that offered in previous analyses. In line with theoretical expectations, we find that voters in regions with a high proportion of interest-sensitive sectors that exhibit a low international integration, such as construction, tend to oppose participation in currency unions. The opposite is true for non-interest-sensitive sectors with a relatively high integration, e.g., non-interest-sensitive services.
These findings are in line with the hypothesis that rational voters will maximize utility by voting in a way such that economic prospects at their locality are maximized. While some regional attributes such as economic centrality, urbanization and proximity to EU borders exhibit distinct impacts within Denmark and Sweden, the impact of the sectors of interest is consistently estimated for both countries. The results are generally robust to spatial dependency, accounting for crossmunicipality commuting and employing OLS or binary choice approaches. In addition to the influence of the regional industry mix and distance from the European core, a large proportion of supporters of political parties that oppose the EMU and a high average age within municipalities emerge as factors that consistently increase opposition to the currency union. While the former supports the notion of a less appropriate common European monetary policy in the periphery, the latter is in line with the hypothesis of a (successful) currency representing an experience good. Apparently, an implicit risk premium is imposed on the new currency that increases with the level of experience with the old currency. While industry mixes can explain the regional voting outcome in the Euro-referenda as expected, they cannot (or do to a much lesser degree) explain the regional support for political parties opposing the new currency, suggesting that we are indeed observing a currency effect rather than a broader effect of Euro-skepticism.
Fig. A1 Spatial Weight Functions
Source: Own illustration. Notes: The endogenous variable is share of "no-votes" in all models. The sector variables represent the share of sector employment at total employment within municipalities. All models include non-sector control variables as in model (1) of Table 1 . The standard errors (S.E.) are robust to heteroskedasticity. * / ** / *** denote significance at the 10 / 5 / 1 % level.
Tab. A1 Results for Sub-Sectors: Sweden
